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Industrial Noise Causing Acoustic Trauma
Heinz Gasser*
s AcousTIc TRAUMA AN ACCIDENT, and do the Workmen's
Compensation Statutes thus save the employer from being
sued in Common Law? Or is it considered an occupational dis-
ease, and thus not within the Acts?
Hearing impairment resulting from exposure to industrial
noise, and the master's possible liability for such injury to the
servant, was appreciated as far back as 1831. An English physi-
cian (Fosbroke) at that time made the first scientific investiga-
tion into the subject. He interviewed boilermakers, weavers, and
persons exposed to noise of small-arms gunfire, and found that in
many cases the worker's hearing had deteriorated to a point
where the man was unable to hear his whispered word.'
Ever since this first scientific investigation, researchers have
tried to agree on just where lies the dividing line between hazard-
ous noise and non-hazardous noise. Today most authorities agree
that it is to be found somewhere between an intensity of 70 and
100 decibels. 2 To be more specific, tones 85 db above .0002
dymes/cm may cause some deafness, temporary or permanent, but
the main area of concern lies in noise levels above 100 decibels.
For the purpose of comparison, here are some of the stand-
ard acceptable noise levels:
Hospitals 35 to 40 decibels
Private Offices 40 to 45 decibels
Factories 45 to 80 decibels
Although it has been demonstrated that small, furry animals,
such as mice, can be killed by high intensity ultra-sonic noises,
these high frequency sounds ordinarily will not cause acoustic
trauma in humans, and in spite of what one may read or hear in
many contemporary science fiction dramas, they are not danger-
ous to man, because a smooth human skin will reflect about 95%
* B. A., University of Cincinnati, and a second year student at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School.
1 Fosbroke, J., Practical Observations on the Pathology and Treatment of
Deafness, 19 Journal-Lancet 645-648.
2 Kryter, K. D., Speech & Hearing Disorders, p. 37, Monogr. Supp. 1 (1950).
See also: Guttman, Deafness, Head Injury, and the Medico-Legal Ear, 33
Eye, E., N. & Thr., Month., 734 (1954); Proctor, G. & W., The Ear in Head
Trauma, 66 Laringoscope (1) 16 (1956).
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1956
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
of these high frequency sound waves at 6000 cycles/sec. and an
even higher percentage at 18,000 cycles/sec.3 This means that it
is very unlikely that there will be any employers' liability claims
arising out of this source.
It seems that the most dangerous noises are those with a fre-
quency between 3000 and 5000 cycles/sec. (In the musical scale,
this would be about the 4th octave above middle C.) People
affected by acoustic trauma are usually deaf, or at least partially
deaf as far as this tone range is concerned, but can hear higher or
lower tones well.
4
Is traumatic deafness a disease or is the disease caused by
trauma? This is the principal question raised in almost all work-
men's compensation cases involving traumatic deafness. This is
because in the states which do not have occupational disease stat-
utes the worker may sue the employer at common law for a
disease arising in the course of his employment, but must claim
under the statute if it is held to be a traumatic injury. One of the
leading cases where this was the main issue was the case of
Winkelman v. Boeing Airplane Co., a Kansas case.5 The plain-
3 Eldrege, D. H., Jr., Sound Problems in the Air Force. United States
Armed Forces Medical Journal 449-461 (1950).
4 Kryter, K. D., supra, n. 2.
5 166 Kan. 503; 203 P. 2d 171 (1949).
The court further summarizes as follows: "In Kansas recovery for in-
dustrial disease unaccompanied and unrelated to any injury by accident
does not come under the act ..."
Chop v. Swift & Co., 118 Kan. 35, 37, 233 P. 800 (1925). Here a girl was
carrying strings of cold sausages continuously from the ice compartment to
a conveyer belt. Musculospiroparalysis was not held to be the result of an
accident and did not come under the Statute.
"There is a twilight zone between clear personal injury by accident, cov-
ered by the act, and disability (occupational disease) not covered by the
act. Each case depends on the facts involved: Hoag v. Kansas Independent
Laundry Co., 113 Kan. 513, 516-518, 215 P. 295 (1923). An engineer coming
out of a boiler was overcome by the heat and subsequently contracted
pneumonia. It was held that the disability was not caused by accident. The
worker's resistance to pneumonia germs was lowered due to an accidental
exhaustion. This is not a Bodily Injury.
"Accident" is simply an undesigned, sudden and unexpected event,
usually of an afflictive or unfortunate character and often accompanied by
a manifestation of force. Gilliand v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement
Co., 104 Kan. 771, 180 P. 793 (1919). The court further remarked that the
elements in the above definition apply to the workmen and not to the em-
ployer or someone else. The accident may result from the intentional per-
formance of usual acts in the usual way. It refers to the resulting harm
rather than to the cause.
There are numerous cases allowing recovery under a Workmen's Com-
pensation Act for injury arising out of and in the course of employment,
even if the total injury has been caused gradually and from a series of
events.
(Continued on next page)
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tiff, Winkelman, was the assistant instructor of plant guards on
the defendant's premises and was in charge of the shooting prac-
tice, which for a period of time was held indoors in a rather con-
fined room. His hearing gradually deteriorated from the noise of
the firing of the .38 calibre pistols.
In reversing judgment for the plaintiff, the court held that
the plaintiff's sole remedy lay under the statute and that his deaf-
ness was compensable as an accidental injury; that each single
shot and the effect thereof on his hearing was sudden and he did
not expect the injury to be permanent. The court went on to say
that even assuming that traumatic deafness may in some sense
properly be denominated an industrial disease, the fact remains
that here a portion of the man's physical structure was definitely
broken down by accidental injury, and that under such circum-
stances the court would not be justified in denominating the in-
jury solely and purely an industrial disease and thereby denying
a workman's compensation recovery under the Act.
Dr. Ernest M. Seydell, a witness for the appellant company,
and a specialist in otolaryngology, offered the following expert
testimony upon cross-examination:
"There are two types of deafness, one where the organ
of hearing is destroyed at once and the other in which there
is a gradual deterioration or loss of hearing; where the explo-
sion is only moderate, the gradual constant hammering will
cause a laying down of the white corpuscles in the blood;
there is some scar tissue in the white corpuscles and the scar
tissue ultimately destroys the organ of hearing.
Q. Is this a disease or is it a trauma?
A. It is a trauma.
Q. In other words, this would be caused, in your opinion,
from a definite trauma he had on the job out there?
A. Yes, sir.
(Continued from preceding page)
Webb v. New Mexico Publishing Co., 47 N. M. 279, 141 P. 2d 333, 148A. L. R. 1002 (1943): A printer allergic to the soap supplied in the em-
ployer's washroom.
Harris v. Southern Carbon Co., 162 So. 430 (La. App., 1935): A tele-
phone lineman's blisters on legs becoming infected.
American Maize Products Co. v. Nichiporchik, 108 Ind. App. 502, 29N. E. 2d 801 (1940): Here a riveter-helper had his hand subjected to a
number of traumatic concussions over a period of years. This was held to
be accidental and not an occupational disease.
Downey v. Kansas City Gas Co., 338 Mo. 803, 92 S. W. 2d 580 (1936): A
pipefitter's helper repeatedly wiped off sweat from his brow with a soot-
covered hand and sleeve. The resulting eye injury was held accidental.Victory Sparkler & Specialty Co. v. Francks, 147 Md. 368, 128 A. 635,
44 A. L. R. 363 (1925): Phosphorous poisoning over a period of time was
held to be an accident under the statute.
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Q. And that trauma is what caused a deterioration of
these little nerve ends as I understand it?
A. That is correct.
Q. But the original source would be the trauma that
occurred on the job in your opinion.
A. That is correct, yes, sir; in my opinion."
The court further held that the mere fact that the workman
is not, during the course of his employment, cognizant of his in-
jury or the extent thereof, of course does not necessarily mean
the injury did not result from an accident arising out of his em-
ployment.
In many of these traumatic deafness cases, the injured person
does not realize the fact that his hearing is starting to deteriorate.
There usually is no pain involved. Only when the intensity of the
sound is very substantially above the danger point will one feel
pain. At the intensity of 120 decibels most persons feel a tickling
or other uncomfortable sensation in their ears; at 140 decibels
most feel pain, and at 160 decibels the eardrum is expected to
burst.6
Opposed to those cases where the trauma is a repeated or
constant noise, and where the organ of hearing is destroyed gradu-
ally over a period of days or years, we have cases involving an
actual perforation of the eardrum, such as in the Oklahoma case
of Andrews Mining and Milling Co. v. Atkinson.7 It involved a
claim for an ear injury as a result of operating a jackhammer in a
small room in a mine for a period of four or five hours. The re-
sulting perforation of an eardrum was deemed an accidental per-
sonal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment,
and thus was compensable under the statute.
There is hardly any room for disagreement with the outcome
of this case, since it is, like the one discussed previously, based on
the theory that each one of the repeated explosions or noises pro-
duced an injury, and that these added up to the resulting dis-
ability. However, how would the courts rule in a case where the
partial deafness was the result of a constant and continuous
noise? We have ten Oklahoma cases involving essentially the
6 Eldrege, D. H., Jr., supra, n. 3.
7 Andrews Mining & Milling Co. v. Atkinson, 135 P. 2d 960 (OkI., 1943).
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same factual circumstances.8 Laborers were engaged in capping
a runaway gas and oil well and were exposed to the loud and
constant roaring sound of the well for a period of four days. The
court again said that the resulting partial and permanent deafness
was caused by accident. Each and every single sound wave was
deemed to have caused trauma. Thus, the workers were limited
to claims for compensation under the Statute.
In the State of New York, and in other states where both
personal injury and occupational diseases are regulated by stat-
s Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v.
Welch, 156 Okla. 243, 10 P. 2d 678 (1932)
Severe, 156 Okla. 246, 10 P. 2d 681 (1932)
Williams, 157 Okla. 80, 10 P. 2d 1093 (1932)
Sharver, 157 Okla. 117, 11 P. 2d 187 (1932)
Stone, 158 Okla. 262, 13 P. 2d 579 (1932)
Colson, 159 Okla. 299, 15 P. 2d 828 (1932)
Glasscock, 159 Okla. 300, 15 P. 2d 829 (1932)
Warren, 159 Okla. 301, 15 P. 2d 830 (1932)
Barrett, 159 Okla. 302, 15 P. 2d 831 (1932)
Collins, 159 Okla. 302, 15 P. 2d 832 (1932).In the Williams case above, the court's syllabus includes the following
cases: U. S. Gypsum Co. v. McMichael, 146 Okla. 74, 293 P. 773 (1930): The
foundation of a Workmen's Compensation claim must be a casualty and it
excludes occupational disease.-Here the worker was loading boxcars with
gypsum rock and the resulting presence of dust was alleged to have caused
the illness and disability. St. Louis Mining & Smelting Co. v. State In-
dustrial Commission, 113 Okla. 179, 241 P. 170 (1925): Here the worker was
overcome by carbon monoxide gas while working in a mine for about 30
minutes, where previously dynamite had been exploded. This was held to
be an occupational disease and not compensable under the statute.
Young v. Melrose Granite Co., 152 Minn. 512, 189 N. W. 426, 29 A. L. R.
506 (1922): The workman's shoulder nerves degenerated because of a con-
tinuous strain in operating a stone surfacing machine, which was defective.
This was held not to be covered as an accident under the act.
Mauchline v. State Ins. Fund, 279 Pa. 524, 124 A. 168 (1924): The em-
ployee, an engineer, developed bronchitis resulting from breathing smoke
and fumes. The resulting emphysemia held not an "accident" under the
statute.
Smith v. International Highspeed Steel Co., 98 N. J. L. 574, 120 A. 188(1923): Disease from breathing small metallic particles held not caused by
accident and recovery was held not to be confined to the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act.
Pronse v. Industrial Commission of Colorado, 69 Colo. 382, 194 P. 625(1920): Death from disease contracted and weakened condition caused by
bad air, not due to "accident" within Compensation Act.
Clinchfield Carbocoal Corp. v. Kiser, 139 Va. 451, 124 S. E. 271 (1924):
A coke plant employee contracting tuberculosis held not to have suffered
an "accident" within Compensation Act.
Industrial Commission v. Russell, 111 Ohio St. 692, 146 N. E. 305 (1924):
The action of ultra-violet rays, which injured the optic nerve of a motion
picture operator was held not compensable under the statute.
Kinsey Heating & Plumbing Co. v. House, 152 Okla. 200, 4 P. 2d 59(1931): An employee overcome by heat while digging ditches. Held to be
an accidental injury.
Bryant v. Beason, 4 P. 2d 106 (Okla. 1935): Industrial Commission's
findings on question whether disability resulted from occupational disease
or accidental injury will not be disturbed.
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ute, there is no need to strictly construe every loss of hearing
as being caused by accident. Thus, in the case of Slawinski v. J.
H. Williams & Co.9 the court affirmed an award for partial deaf-
ness in both ears as an occupational disease which was described
as "tinnitus," and which arose from work in the forge department
of the employer's plant. 100 machine hammers were in constant
operation there, and subjected this worker to an exceptionally
heavy and sustained noise. He was allowed award under the
statute. In the dissenting opinion, the Judge remarked that the
claimant should not be compensated since the partial deafness
did not affect his earning power.
Rosati v. Dispatch Shops'0 is another award in New York for
partial deafness as an occupational disease. The claimant had
been employed for 27 years as a riveter in the defendant's steel
plant and had sustained a progressive permanent loss of hearing
in both ears.
It is difficult to find a common general trend from these cases.
Some hold acoustic trauma to be a disease, others say that it is
an accidental personal injury. Whatever the case may be, the
courts almost always interpret the Workmen's Compensation
Statutes as broadly as possible. Where the Statute does not pro-
vide compensation for occupational disease, the term "accident
arising in the course of the employment" is construed to include
almost any disability having its origin in an occurrence or acci-
dent, thus discouraging common law actions and forcing the
claimant to look to the statute for relief.
The amounts of compensation vary greatly from state to
state, and each jurisdiction has minimum and maximum amounts
which could be paid for scheduled injuries. For example, the
state of Maine schedules a maximum of only $2,700.00 for loss of
hearing in both ears, but under the Federal Employees Com-
pensation Act $24,200.00 can be recovered. The Ohio Statute
would pay the maximum of $4,025.00 and, as in many other
states, regulates the amount of weekly payments. The Ohio
statute allows 66%% of the impairment of the worker's earning
capacity for a period of 25 weeks in the case of permanent total
loss of hearing in one ear, and 125 weeks for a permanent total
9 Slawinski v. J. H. Williams & Co., 213 App. Div. 826, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 888(N. Y. 1948), Aff'd 298 N. Y. 546, 81 N. E. 2d 93, Reargument Denied 298
N. Y. 634, 82 N. E. 2d 29 (N. Y. 1948).
10 Rosati v. Dispatch Shops, Inc., 83 N. E. 2d 860 (N. Y. 1949).
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loss of hearing in both ears. The maximum weekly amount is
$40.25.11
The cases discussed here involve the more common sources
of dangerous noise, such as pistol fire, foundry noises, and mecha-
nized hammers. There are other and new sources which may de-
velop as new, larger and more powerful machines are used in
industry. An example of a new source might be found in avia-
tion. So far, the cases involving aircraft noise are mostly treated
as nuisance cases. However, one must bear in mind that the
noise level of today's jet engine is actually dangerous. Just one
engine emits about 110 to 140 db, depending on the kind of tail-
pipe used and the frequency of the sound. The more powerful
engines emit an even more intense noise of up to 160 db.12 It
follows that persons, such as maintenance personnel, exposed to
this noise, within the radius of about 1000 feet, are endangering
their hearing if such an exposure is continuous over a period of
time. With the increasing number of commercial jet planes be-
ing built now, one might well be concerned.
A case arising out of this hazard would probably, depending
on the jurisdiction, be treated similarly to the case of Vaughn &
Rush v. Stump.13 There the respondent was working in an oil
field about 8 or 10 feet from the exhaust of a pump and for a
period of 12 hours. Later he discovered that he could not hear
out of his left ear any more. The Court held that this was an
accidental injury and confirmed the award as follows: $20.00
total temporary disability, $300.50 as a fair award for approxi-
mately 35% partial permanent loss of hearing in the left ear.
Note that this was a 1932 case. The awards would probably be
higher today.
11 Analysis of Workmen's Compensation Laws. Chamber of Commerce of
the United States (1954). Also, Page's Ohio Revised Code, Sec. 4123.57
(1956 Supp.).
12 Eldrege, D. H., Jr., supra, n. 3.
13 Vaughn & Rush v. Stump, 9 P. 2d 764 (Old., 1932).
See generally as to noise:
Hodges, The Problem of Acoustic Trauma, 73 Canad. M. Asso. J. (9)
713 (1955); Aiken, Combined Environmental Stresses and Manual Dexterity,
Army Med. Research Lab., Project No. 6-95-20-001, Report No. 225 (Fort
Knox, Ky., Mar. 7, 1956); Rouge, Environmental Noise, 55 Nord. Med. (5)
165 (Stockholm, 1956).
For an excellent discussion of the balancing of equities in a case where
business noise creates a nuisance, see, Payne v. Johnson, 20 Wash. 2d 24, 145
P. 2d 552 (1944). And that even an injunction of such noise-making must
be specific and not too sweeping, see, Collins v. Wayne Iron Works, 227
Penna. 326, 76 A. 24, 19 Ann. Cas. 991 (1910).
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1956
